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TORTS - FAMILY LAW - CRIMINAL CONVERSATION -
JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF THE CIVIL" ACTION FOR 
ADULTERY. KLINE v. ANSELL, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 
(1980) . 
. I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kline v. Ansel~ 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland abolished 
the common law cause of action for criminal conversation. Prior to 
the Kline decision, a husband was afforded a remedy against his 
wife's paramour for being the partner in her adulterous acts.2 The 
court has now reversed its position due to the anachronistic policy 
underlying this tort,3 its incompatibility with today's sense of per-
sonal and sexual freedom of women,4 and its inherent violation of 
Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment. 5 
This casenote explains the development of criminal conversation 
as a cause of action and analyzes Maryland's position in relation to 
the modern trend toward abrogation of this tort. In addition, the 
underlying policy reasons that mandated this change in the court's 
position as well as the Kline court's misplaced reliance on the Equal 
Rights Amendment are discussed. 
II. THE FACTS 
Donald and Vivian Ansell were married in 1962 and resided 
together until 1971, when Mr. Ansell was incarcerated.6 After serv-
ing an eighteen-month sentence, he returned to his wife and 
remained with her until November of 1977, when their stormy mar-
riage ended in separation.7 In January or February of 1978, Mrs. 
Ansell began having sexual relations with Floyd Kline.8 When Mr. 
Ansell learned of his wife's affair, he began threatening and harass-
ing Mr. Kline. A confrontation between the two ensued, during 
which Mr. Kline threatened Mr. Ansell with a shotgun. 9 
In September of 1978, Donald Ansell filed suit against Floyd 
Kline alleging criminal conversation and assault.lO The Circuit Court 
for Washington County directed a verdict for the plaintiff Ansell on 
1. 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980). 
2. See Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976). 
3. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md 585, 588-89, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (1980). 
4. Id. at 589, 414 A.2d at 931. 
5. Id. at 591-92, 414 A.2d at 932-33. See text accompanying notes 75-79 infro. 
6. Brief for Appellant at 2, Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980). 
7. Id. at 2-3. 
8. Id. at 3. Mr. Kline and Mrs. Ansell currently reside together as husband and wife. Id. at 
2-3. 
9. Id. at 3. 
10. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 586, 414 A.2d 929, 929-30 (1980). 
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the criminal conversation charge. The assault charge, however, went 
to the jury, and the defendant Kline was found liable for assault. 
Damages were awarded in the amount of $40,000 compensatory and 
$4,250 punitive for the criminal conversation and $6,000 compen-
satory and $4,000 punitive for the assault.u Mr. Kline's appeal 
reached the court of appeals on a writ of certiorari prior to considera-
tion by the court of special appeals. 12 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. General Development of the Tort of Criminal Conversation 
At common law, a claim of criminal conversation13 could be 
raised by a husband in an action in trespass vi et armis14 against his 
wife's paramour for interference with the husband's right to his 
wife's services. 15 Although the cause of action was regarded as an in-
tentional tort, the elements were only a valid marriage and an act of 
sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's wife;16 
proof of malice was unnecessary.17 
The only recognized defense to criminal conversation was the 
husband's consent,18 whether express or apparent.19 The defendant's 
lack of intent or ignorance of the wife's marital status was not a 
legally permissible defense,20 nor was a subsequent divorce21 or legal 
separation.22 Even adulterous acts by a husband could not counter- . 
act the criminal conversation of his wife and a third party, although 
evidence of this nature was admissible to mitigate damages.23 
11. Id. at 586, 414 A.2d at 930. 
12. Id. 
13. Dean Prosser explained that it was" 'criminal' because it was an ecclesiastical crime; 'con-
versation' in the sense of intercourse." W. PRoSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 
§ 124, at 875 n.75 (4th ed. 1971). 
14. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ·139. The action was brought in trespass because the 
wife was considered her husband's chattel Comment, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 
CoLUM. L. REV. 651, 656-57 (1930) (hereinafter cited as Consortium). 
15. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ·139-40. 
16. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408 (1962). 
17. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904). Because malice need not be shown, some 
courts have considered criminal conversation a strict liability tort. E.g., Fadgen v. 
Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976). 
18. Kohlhoss v. Mobley, 102 Md. 199, 206, 62 A. 236, 236-37 (1905). See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 687 (1977). 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 687, Comment b (1977). 
20. Comment, Piracy on the Matrimonial Seas - The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. 
L.J. 594, 598 (1971). Moreover, the Restatement suggests that even misrepresentation by 
the spouse of his or her marital status is not a defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
685, Comment f (1977). See also Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949). 
21. Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666,174 A.2d 122 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
689(2) (1977). 
22. Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 689(2) (1977). 
23. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120, 130, 237 N.W.2d 118, 126 (1975). 
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For several centuries only a husband could sue for criminal con-
versation. A wife's inability to sue her husband's paramour resulted 
from the underlying basis of the cause of action for criminal conver-
sation. At common law, a husband was regarded as having a pro-
prietary right in his wife.24 "The wife was considered the husband's 
servant, and anyone who interfered with the right of a master to the 
services of his servant was liable to him in damages. "26 An action for 
criminal conversation therefore evolved as a remedy for the invasion 
of a husband's property rights. In 1904, however, the Supreme Court 
recognized, in Tinker v. Colwel~ 26 that criminal conversation also 
constituted an interference with the husband's personal rights, such 
as his marital right to exclusive intercourse with his wife.27 As a 
result of the recognition that an action for criminal conversation 
involved a direct interference with the marital relationship and the 
widespread acceptance of married women's property acts,28 most 
states adopted the view that a wife could sue her husband's 
paramour.29 Today, a vast majority of the states, either by specific 
statuteSO or by a liberal interpretation of the married women's act,SJ 
have granted a wife the same rights and remedies that her husband 
has historically enjoyed. 
It is unclear whether damages awarded in a criminal conversa-
tion suit were to be considered punitive or compensatory.S2 A New 
York court has suggested that the better-reasoned view categorizes 
such damages as punitive, based on the theory that courts, in award-
ing large damages for the incidental effects of the defilement of the 
24. Consortium, supra note 14, at 659. 
25. [d. at 655-56. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ·143. One reason why the wife did 
not have a similar cause of action was that she was considered inferior and "the inferior 
hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior as the 
superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss 
or injury." [d. See generally 8 HOLDSWORTH, HIS'fORY OF ENGLISH LAw 429-30 (2d ed. 
1937). 
26. 193 U.S. 473 (1904). 
27. [d. at 485. 
28. See W. PRoSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 124, at 881-82 (4th ed. 1971). 
29. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comment d (1977), states: "[A]n action for 
criminal conversation ... involves a direct interference with the marital relationship, and 
since the married women's acts these causes of action have consistently been made as 
available to the wife as to the husband." See also Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 161, 
140 N.E. 227, 229, rehearing denied, 236 N.Y. 643, 142 N.E. 317 (1923). 
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comment d (1977). See Markson v. Shelton, 124 
F. Supp. 206 (D. Kan. 1954) (construing a 1905 Wisconsin statutory amendment which 
provided that a wife could bring an action for alienation of affections). 
31. See, e.g., Sims v. Sims, 79 N.J.L. 577, 76 A. 1063 (1910); Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 
682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959); Scates v. 
Nailling, 196 Tenn. 508, 268 S.W.2d 561 (1954); Newsom v. Fleming, 165 Va. 89,181 S.E. 
393 (1935); Woodman v. Goodrich, 234 Wis. 565, 291 N.W. 768 (1940). 
32. See Consortium, supra note 14, at 656-57. 
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marriage bed,33 attempt to punish the defendant in order to deter a 
recurrence of his behavior.34 Moreover, the excessive damage awards 
likely reflect the judges' or juries' sympathy or moral indignation 
and not the damage suffered.35 In addition to being very large and 
exemplary, damages for criminal conversation usually are founded 
upon inexact computations.36 Some states have legislatively 
remedied these problems by limiting recovery to actual damages 
only, specifically excluding punitive, exemplary, and aggravated 
damages.37 In the majority of states, however, courts acknowledge 
the tenuous relationship between the amount of injury suffered and 
the damages awarded yet continue to award excessive damages. 38 
During the 1930's, legislative receptivity to the abolition of the 
tort of criminal conversation surfaced due to the inappropriate 
application of a damage remedy to injured feelings and the prev-
alence of the husband's blackmail of the paramour.S9 Many objec-
tions arose because the existence of this cause of action "afforded a 
fertile field for blackmail and extortion by means of manufactured 
suits in which the threat of publicity [was] used to force a 
settlement. "40 Based upon such considerations, Indiana became the 
33. See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). Such "incidental effects" include wounded 
pride and affection, suspicion cast on the legitimacy of offspring, and loss of consortium. 
Id at 484. See, e.g., Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123 (1883); Oppenheim v. Kride!, 236 
N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227, rehearing denied, 236 N.Y. 643,142 N.E. 317 (1923). 
34. Consortium, .supra note 14, at 657 (citing Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y.S. 459 
(1900)). 
35. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm, .. 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 979 (1935) 
[hereinafter cited as Feinsinger]. 
36. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *139-40. 
37. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 42-44 (Smith-Hurd 1959). Although the Illinois statute 
does not define what constitutes actual damages in an action for criminal conversation, it 
does identify elements not to be considered in determining damages: 
In determining the damages to be allowed in any action for criminal conversa-
tion, none of the following elements shall be considered: the wealth or position of 
defendant or the defendant's prospects of wealth or position; mental anguish suf-
fered by plaintiff; any injury to plaintiff's feelings; shame, humiliation, sorrow or 
mortification suffered by plaintiff; defamation or injury to the good name or 
character of plaintiff or his or her spouse resulting from the criminal conversa-
tion complained of; or dishonor to plaintiff's family resulting from the criminal 
conversation. 
Id § 44. 
38. See, e.g., Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 471-72, 268 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1978). In Breiner 
v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120,237 N.W.2d 118 (1975), the court recognized that "it is the general 
rule that in an action for criminal conversation damages are incapable of precise measure-
ment and there is no fixed rule for determining the amount thereof." Id at 130, 237 
N.W.2d at 125. 
39. Feinsinger, supra note 35, at 979. See also Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FoR!). 
HAM L. REV. 63 (1936). 
40. W. PROSSER, liANnBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 124, at 887 (4th ed. 1971). Similarly, one 
commentator has noted that "the threat of notoriety incident to such a suit offers a con-
venient medium for extortion of large sums from innocent defendants." Feinsinger, supra 
note 35, at 992. 
1980] Kline v. Ansell 209 
first state to statutorily abolish criminal conversation in 1935;41 New 
York took similar legislative action shortly thereafter.42 
A growing minority of states have abolished the tort of criminal 
conversation. To date, sixteen states and the District of Columbia 
have statutorily abrogated this tort,43 while two jurisdictions have 
judicially abolished the cause of action.44 In 1976, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in Fadgen v. Lenkner45 asserted that "the cause of 
action itself is an anachronism and that in today's society it is unrea-
sonable to impose upon a defendant such harsh results without 
affording any real opportunity to interject logically valid defenses on 
the merits .... "46 More recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa judi-
cially abolished criminal conversation, employing a similar rationale 
for its action.47 A majority of states, however, still recognize the 
cause of action for criminal conversation, citing protection of the 
sanctity of the marital relationship and similar policy reasons as 
justification for allowing such suits.46 In most of these jurisdictions, 
the definition of criminal conversation has been expanded to allow a 
wife to bring suit against her husband's paramour.49 
41. Law of March 11,1935, ch. 208, § I, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (codified at IND. CoDE § 34-4-4-1 
(1976)). 
42. Law of March 29,1935, ch. 263, §§ 61a-61i, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732 (codified at N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAw § 8O-a (McKinney 1976)). Section 61a, entitled "Declaration of Public Poliey 
of the State," provided in pertinent part: 
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based 
upon ... criminal conversation ... , having been subjected to grave abuses, caus-
ing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to 
many persons wholly innocent and free olany wrongdoing, who were merely the 
victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupu-
lous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished 
vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many 
cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the 
public poliey of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be 
served by the abolition of such remedies. 
Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 63 (1936). 
43. See ALA. CoDE § 6-5-331 (1977); CAL. CIV. CoDE § 43.5 (West 1954); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 
13-20-202 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52·572f (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 
10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CoDE ENCYcL § 16-923 (West 'Stlpp. 1978); FLA. STAT. §§ 
771.01-.08 (1964); IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-4-4·1 (Burns Supp. 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 
600.2901 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 
(West 1952); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAw § 80-a (McKinney 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.840. 
30.850(1977); TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. tit. 1. § 4.05 (Vernon Supp.198O); VA. CoDE§ 8.01-220 
(1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 768.0 1 (West 1980); WYo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977). 
44. See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner. 469 Pa. 272, 
365 A.2d 147 (1976). 
45. 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976). 
46. Id at 280-81, 365 A.2d at 151 (footnote omitted). 
47. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128. 135 (Iowa 1978). 
48. See, e.g., Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467. 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978). See 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 
495 (1973), which states that "[tlhe primary rationale for establishing and maintaining the 
cause of action of criminal conversation has been that it supposedly protects the sanctity 
of the marriage by acting as a deterrent to third persons to prevent interference in family 
relations." Id at 498. 
49. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. 
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B. The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Maryland 
The development of Maryland law surrounding the tort of 
criminal conversation has deviated from the path followed by the 
majority of states. Criminal conversation was first recognized in 
1828 in Fomshill v. Murray,50 which stated in dictum that an actual 
marriage must be proved in order to sustain this cause of action. 51 
As early as 1905, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in 
Kohlhoss v. Mobley 52 that active or passive consent by a husband to 
his wife's adultery barred an action for criminal conversation. In that 
case, the husband was found to have granted passive consent by not 
protesting to plans between his wife and her paramour. 53 The court 
reasoned that the husband had "afford[ed] to their incipient amour 
full opportunity to develop and mature into her complete dis-
honor."64 
Although Maryland adopted the Married Women's Property 
Act in 1898,55 only recently has a wife been granted the right to sue 
for criminal conversation.66 Shortly after the passage of the Act, the 
court of appeals, in Wolf v. Frank, 57 allowed a woman to bring a tort 
action against her husband's paramour for alienation of affections, 58 
a right not afforded a wife at common law, thereby granting a wife 
rights equal to those of her husband. 59 The court of appeals subse-
50. 35 Md. 452 (1828). 
51. Id at 455. 
52. 102 Md. 199,62 A. 236 (1905). 
53. Id at 206, 62 A. at 236. The court relied upon the general rule that: 
Id 
If . . . the conduct of the husband as established by undisputed evidence rJ" 
admitted in his own testimony is such that a rational mind could draw no other 
conclusion therefrom than that he had consented actively or passively to the 
conduct on the part of his wife and the defendant of which he complains, the 
question would become one of law .... 
54. Id at 211, 62 A. at 238. 
55. Law of April 9, 1898, ch. 457, § 5, 1898 Md. Laws 1082 (current version at MD. ANN. CoDE 
art. 45, § 5 (Supp. 1980)). The Act currently states in pertinent part: "Married women 
shall have power ... to sue ... for torts committed against them, as fully as if they were 
unmarried .... " I d 
56. Kromm v. Kromm, 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 278 Md 726 (1976). 
57. 92 Md. 138,48 A. 132 (1900). 
58. Id at 143, 48 A. at 134. Alienation of affections is closely related to criminal conversation 
in that it is also directed at protecting a spouse against intentional interference with the 
marriage relationship. See Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. 
REV. 472, 473-74 (1934). This action is distinguishable from criminal conversation, 
however, because proof of the defendant's intent to interfere with the marital relationship 
must be shown, whereas such intent is presumed in the case of criminal conversation. Fur-
thermore, alienation of affections results in the deprivation of the wronged spouse's right 
to the aid, comfort, assistance, and society of the other spouse in the family relationship; 
criminal conversation injures the husband's right to exchIsive sexual intercourse with his 
wife. Finally, proof of adultery, which is enough to sustain a cause of action for criminal 
conversation, is insufficient for alienation of affections.ld at 473. 
59. Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 143, 48 A. 132, 134 (1900). 
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quently limited the effect of the Act. however. by holding that the 
purpose of the Act "was not to enable [a wife) to maintain suits that 
she could not have maintained before its passage but only to bring in 
her own name those which before she must have brought in her hus-
band's name either alone or as party plaintiff with her."60 Despite 
this limitation of the Act, in the 1976 case of Kromm v. Kromm, 61 the 
court of special appeals concluded that, because of the decision in 
Wolf,62 it was compelled to hold that an action for criminal conversa-
tion may be maintained by a wife.63 
Although the Maryland General Assembly abolished the 
closely-related tort of alienation of affections in 1945,64 this legisla-
tive action was thereafter held not to affect the common law action 
for criminal conversation.66 As recently as 1976, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Geelhoed v. Jensen66 recognized that 
criminal conversation was still a viable cause of action in this state.67 
Moreover, the 1977 General Assembly rejected a bill proposing the 
abolition of the tort of criminal conversation in Maryland.68 
IV. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS OF KLINE 
Despite the General Assembly's refusal to abrogate criminal 
conversation, the court of appeals in Kline v. AnseU69 judicially abro-
gated the common law cause of action for criminal conversation in 
60. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 522, 135 A.2d 886, 887 (l957). See also Hudson v. 
Hudson. 226 Md 521, 174 A.2d 339 (l961) (Married Women's Property Act did not give a 
wife the right to sue her husband for a tort committed against her); Furstenburg v. 
Furstenburg, 152 Md 247,136 A. 543 (l927) (Act did not give wife the right to sue her 
husband or his employer for tort committed against her). But see Lusby v. Lusby, 283 
Md 334, 390 A.2d 77 (l978) (court of appeals permitted exception to interspousal tort 
immunity if tort committed is outrageous in nature, but did not base its holding on the 
Married Women's Property Act). 
61. 31 Md App. 635, 358 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 278 Md 726 (l976). 
62. 92 Md 138,48 A. 132 (l900). 
63. 31 Md App. 635, 637, 358 A.2d 247, 249, cert. denied, 278 Md 726 (l976). 
64. Law of May 4,1945, ch. 10lO, § I, 1945 Md Laws 1760 (current version at MD. Drs. & 
JUD. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 5-301(i1) (1980)). Section 5-301(a) states in pertinent part: "A cause 
of action for alienation of affections is prohibited whether it arose in the State or 
elsewhere." Id 
65. DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512,197 A.2d 245 (l964). See 24 MD. L. REv. 358 (l964). 
66. 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (l976). Although this case deals primarily with a jurisdictional 
question. the suit involved was for criminal conversation. 
67. The court of appeals cited the definition of criminal conversation as stated in the RESTATE· 
MENT OF TORTS § 685 (1938): "One who, without the husband's consent, has sexual inter-
course with a married woman is liable to the husband for the harm thereby caused to any 
of his legally protected marital interests." 277 Md 220, 224, 352 A.2d 818, 821 (l976). 
68. See MD. S.J. 3034, 3514 (l977); MD. H.J. 162, 2397, 2904 (l977). The bill received a favor-
able committee report and was unanimously passed by the House. The Senate, however, 
gave it an unfavorable report. 
69. 287 Md. 585,414 A.2d 929 (l980). 
212 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 10 
Maryland. In reviewing the background of this tort, the Kline court 
considered its historical basis and its current treatment in the 
United States as well as the development of relevant case and statu-
tory law in Maryland.70 Judge Davidson, writing for a unanimous 
court, cited with favor a variety of policy reasons in support of her 
conclusion that criminal conversation was an unreasonable and 
anachronistic cause of action.71 After reviewing Maryland precedent, 
however, she noted that "[w]ere the interrelated judicial and legisla-
tive history of this action in Maryland the only factor to be con-
sidered, we would deem it inappropriate to predicate its demise on 
the ground that it is unreasonable and anachronistic. "72 
In its analysis, the Kline court summarily considered the general 
policy of judicial restraint which mandates that the common law be 
abrogated by legislative action.73 The court also cited the relatively 
recent, albeit generally accepted, doctrine that the common law may 
be changed by judicial decision if it has become "unsound in the cir-
cumstances of modern life."74 Judge Davidson then looked to Mary-
land's Equal Rights Amendment (ERA),75 a unique basis for the 
abolition of the action for criminal conversation. Article 46 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."76 Noting its 
earlier decision in Rand v. Rand, 77 the court of appeals reiterated its 
commitment to the ERA: 
[W]e believe that the "broad, sweeping, mandatory lan-
guage" of the amendment is cogent evidence that the people 
of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and 
women. The adoption of the E.R.A. in this state was 
70. Id. at 587-90,414 A.2d at 930-32. 
71. Id. at 589, 414 A.2d at 931. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra. 
72. 287 Md. 585, 591, 414 A.2d 929, 932 (1980). 
73. Id. at 590, 414 A.2d at 931. See MD. CoNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (common law is sub-
ject to revision, amendment, or repeal by the legislature). 
74. 287 Md. 585, 590, 414 A.2d 929,931 (1980). In Maryland, common law generally has been 
changed by judicial decision when the legislature has failed to take action. See McGarvey 
v. McGarvey, 286 Md. 19,27,405 A.2d 250, 254 (1979); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 715, 
404 A.2d 1073, 1078-79 (1979); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-42, 396 A.2d 1054, 
1072-73 (1979); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966). But see 
Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 56-57, 405 A.2d 255, 258 (1979). 
Two appellate courts in other jurisdictions recently had the opportunity to abolish 
the action for criminal conversation, but deferred to the legislature to perform this func-
tion. See Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 286 N.W.2d 582 (1978); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 
493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973), . 
75. MD. CoNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46. For an overview of the ERA's impact on the treat-
ment of the tort of criminal conversation in Maryland, see Legislation, The Maryland 
Equal Rights Amendment: Eight Years of Application, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 342, 361":"S3 
(1980). 
76. MD. CoNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46. 
77. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (19771. 
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intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of 
the validity of sex-based classifications.78 
213 
Based upon the dictates of the ERA, the Kline court held that the 
common law cause of action for criminal conversation is unconstitu-
tional.79 The language of the ERA was applied to the common law's 
disparate treatment of men and women. The court reasoned that 
Maryland's law provided different benefits for its citizens based 
solely upon their sex by allowing a man, but not a woman, a cause of 
action for criminal conversation. Similarly, a man who performed 
adulterous acts with another man's wife was civilly liable for 
damages, but a woman who engaged in such activity with another 
woman's husband was not. The common law therefore also imposed 
different burdens upon Maryland's citizens. 
In basing the abrogation of the tort of criminal conversation on 
the ERA, the court of appeals failed to recognize that, at the time of 
its decision, the law in Maryland complied with the ERA's mandate 
of sexual equality. The 1976 court of special appeals' decision in 
Kromm v. Kromm, 80 by which Maryland joined the majority view, 
placed a wife on equal footing with her husband by allowing her to 
maintain an action for criminal conversation based on a broad inter-
pretation of the Married Women's Property Act.81 Without citing 
Kromm, the Kline court implicitly overruled that decision by inter-
preting the Act as granting a woman rights equal to those of an 
unmarried woman rather than equal to those of her husband.82 The 
court's commitment to equalizing treatment of the sexes83 could 
have been achieved by reliance on a more analytically defensible 
ground merely by affirming the Kromm decision. 
The court's decision, nonetheless, is one in which the ends 
justify the means. Judge Davidson's brief discussion of the policy 
reasons underlying the need for abrogation of this tort in modern 
times is similar to rationales used in other jurisdictions to justify 
abolishing the cause of action for criminal conversation.84 The fre-
78. 287 Md. 585, 591. 414 A.2d 929, 932 (1980) (quoting Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 515-16, 
374 A.2d 900,904-05 (1977)). 
79. 287 Md. 585, 593, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (1980). 
80. 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 278 Md. 726 (1976). 
81. See text accompanying notes 55-63 supra. Judge Davidson acknowledged that other 
jurisdictions have interpreted the married women's acts as allowing a woman to sue for 
criminal conversation. 287 Md. 585, 593 n.4, 414 A.2d 929, 933 n.4 (1980). 
82. 287 Md. 585, 593 n.4, 414 A.2d 929, 933 n.4 (1980). Kromm relied on the broad interpreta-
tion of the Married Women's Property Act given in Wolf v. FrSnk, 92 Md. 138, 143,48 A. 
132, 134 (1900), which involved a cause of action for alienation of affections by a spouse 
against a third party. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra. The Kline court, 
however, relied on the narrow interpretation of the Act found in interspousal tort immu-
nity cases. 287 Md. at 593 n.4, 414 A.2d at 933 n.4. See cases cited note 60 supra. 
83. 287 Md. 585, 593, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (1980). 
84. See, e.g., Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W. 2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 
272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976). 
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quently cited problems of blackmail, 85 collusion,86 and excessive 
damage awards87 as well as the recognition of the husband's consent 
as the only valid defense,88 compel the demise of this action. More-
over, any motive to preserve the marital relationship is thwarted 
when a spouse is afforded a legal battleground for his vengeance or 
mercenary enrichment.89 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the court of appeals' decision in Kline v. Ansel4 Maryland 
joined the modern trend to abrogate the common law cause of action 
for criminal conversation. A paramour in Maryland, therefore, will 
no longer be subject to the threat of suit by a cuckolded husband. 
Redress for adultery finds an appropriate place, instead, in a divorce 
action, a criminal charge, or a combination of these remedies.90 
In most of those jurisdictions that continue to permit an action 
for criminal conversation, the right of the wife to sue her husband's 
paramour for criminal conversation has been recognized. Future 
abrogation, therefore, will be predicated upon the inherent problems 
of blackmail, inaccurate and excessive damage awards, inadequacy 
of defenses available to the paramour, and general incompatibility 
with the circumstances of modern life, rather than upon a commit-
ment to comply with the mandate of the ERA. 
Sherry Hamburg Flax 
85. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra. 
86. See 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369. 1388-89 (1979); 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426. 430 (1972). 
87. E.g., Fadgen v. Lenkner. 469 Pa. 272. 279. 365 A.2d 147. 151 (1976). 
88. E.g .• Bearbower v. Merry. 266 N.w.2d 128. 130 (Iowa 1978). 
89. In Bearbower v. Merry. 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978). Justice McCormick. dissenting in 
part. stated: 
Any third person who kicks at the cornerstone of a shaky marriage will not bring 
it down without active support from one or both of the parties. It is simplistic 
and unrealistic to suppose the edifice will be held together either so long as or 
because spouses have the right to obtain vengeance in the form of damage suits 
against the third person. Although a recovery of damages will punish the third 
person and sooth [sic] the ego while enriching the purse of the plaintiff. it is 
hardly calculated to be a constructive influence in maintaining or restoring a 
mature and stable marriage .... 
Id at 138 (McCormick, J .. dissenting in part). 
90. Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718. 727. 415 A.2d 625. 631 (1980). 
